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Abstract
Previous research argues that customer switching costs play an important role in the
firm’s ability to retain customers and achieve competitive advantage. Research also indicates
that in the increasingly networked environment, switching costs are changing in important
ways. Despite switching costs’ recognized role in contributing to competitive advantage and
their increasingly strategic characteristics in the expanding networked environment, we find a
lack  of  coherence  and  completeness  in  the  conceptual  tools  and  models  developed  to
understand their role and help effectively manage the phenomenon. In this paper we attempt
to address these needs by expanding and refining the conceptualization of switching costs
and developing a more comprehensive framework for managers.
(Forthcoming in 2003 in Management Research)
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Introduction
The strategic management literature is focused on how firms can create and sustain
competitive  advantage.  While  researchers,  consultants,  and  managers  differ  in  the
perspectives and approaches they have developed to achieve this goal, they are consistent in
at least one aspect – their effort to successfully identify, understand, and manage the key
strategic elements that lead to superior performance. A review of the strategy, economics, and
marketing literature indicates that one of the more important strategic elements is a force
known  as  customer  switching  costs  (Porter  1980,  1985;  Klemperer  1995;  Kotler,  1997;
Shapiro and Varian, 1999; Hax and Wilde II, 1999, 2001). 
Customer switching costs are generally defined as costs that deter customers from
switching to a competitor’s product or service. These costs include elements such as the
customers’ time, effort, and knowledge that they invest in products, services, or relationships.
While  switching  costs  have  always  been  considered  an  important  element  in  achieving
competitive advantage, research indicates that they are becoming even more strategic in the
increasingly networked environment (Arthur, 1989, 1990, 1996; Economides, 1995; Yoffie,
1996; Bakos, 1997; Butler et al., 1997; Evans and Wurster, 1997; Shapiro and Varian, 1999;
Hax  and  Wilde  II,  2001).  The  unique  characteristics  of  today’s  expanding  networked
environment  –  high-speed  low-cost  communications,  digitalization,  globalization,  and  the
Internet – are impacting both the potential of switching costs and the strategies needed to
achieve them. 
Despite the fact that researchers have long recognized the existence and importance
of switching costs, a review of the literature indicates a lack of coherence and completeness
in  the  conceptual  work  that  attempts  to  provide  managers  with  better  concepts,  tools  or
models for effectively dealing with this increasingly strategic element. The aim of this paper,
therefore,  is  to  highlight  the  strategic  role  that  customer  switching  costs  play  both  in
traditional sectors and in the expanding networked environment, to expand and improve upon
the conceptualization of the force, and to develop a customer switching cost framework in an
effort to improve understanding and management of this phenomenon.
The paper is organized as follows. In the first section we emphasize the strategic
importance of customer switching costs by analyzing their role in the strategy, economics, and
marketing literature. Next we explore why switching costs are even more strategic in today’s
networked  environment.  In  the  third  section  we  discuss  and  expand  upon  the  concept  of
The financial support of the PwC-IESE eBusiness Center is gratefully acknowledged.customer  switching  costs  in  an  effort  to  provide  a  more  complete  and  useful
conceptualization.  Next  we  discuss  the  key  issues  and  challenges  involved  in  managing
switching costs. In the fifth section we attempt to develop a switching cost framework to help
improve  understanding  and  management  of  these  challenges.  Finally,  we  discuss  key
implications  of  the  paper  and  offer  our  conclusions.  To  simplify  our  discussion  for  the
remainder of the paper, customer switching costs will be referred to simply as switching costs.
1. The Strategic Importance of Switching Costs 
The strategic importance of switching costs has been recognized and researched by
several  academic  disciplines,  primarily  strategy,  economics,  and  marketing  (Porter,  1980,
1985; Rumelt, 1987; Lieberman and Montgomery, 1988; Klemperer, 1987a, 1987b, 1995;
Kotler, 1997; Shapiro and Varian, 1999; Hax and Wilde II, 1999, 2001). From the strategy
perspective, Porter consistently discusses the importance of switching costs throughout his
two  seminal  works,  Competitive Strategy (1980)  and  Competitive Advantage (1985).  In
Competitive Strategy he  explains  that  to  achieve  competitive  advantage  managers  must
understand the five basic competitive forces (1- threat of entry, 2- supplier power, 3- buyer
power, 4- substitutes, and 5- rivalry) their businesses face within their industry and then to
best position themselves to defend against the forces as well as to influence them in the
company’s favor. To understand and manage these forces, he emphasizes the need to go
beyond just analyzing the forces to analyzing their underlying sources. He argues that it is the
knowledge of these underlying sources that enables firms to create and implement the most
effective competitive strategy, and he identifies switching costs as one of the key underlying
sources affecting all five forces.  
In a work by Hax and Wilde II (2001) called The Delta Project, the authors highlight
the strategic role of switching costs by discussing the importance of customer bonding, a
concept they define as a deep and powerful relationship with the customer. In their view
“strategy – in both the new and the old economy – may be, and in many cases should be,
formulated on the basis of bonding.” If formulated and executed successfully, they add that
these “customer focused options can create an unassailable competitive advantage.”
Strategy work focusing on the areas of entrepreneurship and first mover advantage
describes switching costs as key isolating mechanisms, impediments, or frictions that deter
competitors from easily or immediately imitating the firm’s innovation and appropriating its
rent (Rumelt, 1987; Lieberman and Montgomery, 1988). Regardless of whether those firms
achieved  their  first  mover  opportunity  because  of  unique  resources,  foresight,  or  simply
because of luck, it is argued that these isolating mechanisms enable such firms to exploit their
position to enhance the size and duration of the first mover profits.
In the economics literature several researchers have studied the role of switching
costs (Porter, 1980, 1985; Katz and Shapiro, 1985; Farrell and Saloner, 1986; Farrell and
Gallini,  1988;  Farrell  and  Shapiro,  1988;  Klemperer,  1987a,  1987b,  1995;  Shapiro  and
Varian, 1999; Shapiro, 2000). Klemperer uses theoretical models to show that in certain cases
consumers  face  switching  costs  after  choosing  among  products  that  were  ex ante
undifferentiated.  As  a  result,  in  subsequent  purchases  rational  consumers  display  brand
loyalty when faced with a choice between functionally identical products. He claims that the
role of switching costs, or the unwillingness of consumers to switch suppliers, can help to
explain important aspects of firm competition, such as why it may be rational for managers to
focus so much on market share. In their book Information Rules (1999), Shapiro and Varian
emphasize  that  “switching  costs  are  the  norm,  not  the  exception,  in  the  information
2economy.” They explain that “the way to win in markets with switching costs is neither to
avoid lock-in nor to embrace it. You need to think strategically: look ahead and reason back.”
In the marketing field, switching costs are identified as playing a key role in the
process  of  creating  strong  customer  loyalty  (Kotler,  1997).  This  process,  known  as
relationship marketing, involves all of the actions a firm can take to better understand and
satisfy its customer. An important part of relationship marketing is attracting and retaining
customers,  as  outlined  below  in  the  Customer-Development  Process  diagram  (Figure  1).
Kotler points out that there are two primary ways to retain loyal customers: increasing the
level of customer satisfaction and raising switching costs.
Figure 1. The Customer-Development process
Source: Adapted from Kotler (1997), Griffin 81995), and Raphel and Raphel (1995).
Based on the literature reviewed we see that researchers in strategy, economics, and
marketing clearly recognize the strategic importance of switching costs. Although the goal of
creating and managing switching costs is described in various ways in the literature, the
authors are consistent in emphasizing the need to understand and effectively manage this
phenomenon. In the next section we explore how switching costs become even more strategic
in today’s competitive environment.
2. Why Switching Costs are More Strategic in Today’s Competitive Environment
Many different strategies can be implemented to achieve switching costs, and many
different strengths or degrees of switching costs can be obtained. The strategies and strengths
available depend in large part on the context in which the firm competes. We find that several
key changes brought on by the advances in technology and the growth in the use of the
Internet make switching costs a more strategic force in today’s competitive environment.
These changes and their impact on switching costs are outlined below.
Networks, Standards, and Switching Costs
The first change is the growth in the use of the Internet and other computer and
communications technologies. This growth has enabled the developed countries of the world
to  change  from  economies  based  on  the  processing  of  resources  and  raw  materials  to
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important  because  as  more  and  more  economic  activity  is  based  on  technology  and
information, and as firms and customers increasingly interconnect over the Internet’s open
standards, the world is increasingly becoming one large network. 
While switching costs are an important force in all business environments, they are
significantly more pronounced in network environments (Economides, 1998) because of a
network’s structure: it is composed of links that connect nodes, many different components
make up the links and nodes, these components are complements to one another, and to be
complementary the components must be compatible (Economides, 1996). In other words,
the network works as a unified system. This system is built around a standard with which the
components  are  made  compatible.  Because  of  this  system  structure  and  the  need  for
participants in the network to have complementarity between components, network industries
contain network externalities and positive feedback, also called increasing returns (Katz and
Shapiro, 1985; Arthur, 1989; Shapiro and Varian, 1999).
The  combination  of  these  forces  makes  network  industries  high  switching  cost
industries.  Network  externalities,  also  known  as  network  effects  or  positive  consumption
externalities, exist when a user values a good or service more as the total number of users for
that good or service increases. A common example is the fax machine – as more people own
faxes, faxes become more valuable to each individual user. Positive feedback is a force that
“makes the strong get stronger and the weak get weaker” (Shapiro and Varian, 1999). As
Arthur (1990) describes, when a firm, product, or technology in a network industry gets
ahead of the competition (whether by strategy or by chance), it tends to get further ahead,
while one that is behind tends to get further behind. Such markets are described as tippy and
often lead to a monopoly situation in which one firm takes over, or in other words, locks-in
most or all of the market. 
Because size and stability of market share matters in these markets, the key assets are
not  state-of-the-art  manufacturing  or  raw  materials  but  rather  a  locked-in  installed  base
(Shapiro and Varian, 1999). The shift from the manufacturing economy to the information
economy has forced many firms to focus on supply-side and demand-side economies of scale,
as increasing returns exist alongside diminishing returns. The reason for this is that many of
the high tech firms competing in network industries have unique cost structures – high fixed
costs up front and minimal variable costs thereafter. For example, although Microsoft must
spend millions of dollars to produce the first version of its operating system, reproducing it
costs only pennies. Therefore, while most traditional manufacturing firms face diminishing
returns (where variable costs fall only up to a certain point beyond which they begin to rise),
many firms in the network industries enjoy this additional benefit of increasing returns which,
according to Arthur (1996), “reign in the new, knowledge-based industries.” Entire markets
can become locked-in, he adds, and it is not necessarily the best product that wins.
In  addition  to  understanding  the  role  of  switching  costs  between incompatible
networks or standards as discussed above, where switching costs tend to be very high, it is
important to understand the role of switching costs within a network or standard, where they
tend to be much lower. For example, switching costs were high throughout the battle between
video recorder standards Beta and VHS. Since a Beta owner’s video collection could not be
viewed with an incompatible VHS recorder, and vice versa, customers faced high switching
costs  when  switching  recorder  standards.  Once  VHS  established  itself  as  the  industry
standard,  the  battle  between standards  disappeared,  leaving  only  competition  within the
standard. The switching costs for changing among different VHS brands were extremely low
because  several  manufacturers  produced  nearly  identical  products  and  customers’  video
collections could now be used with all video recorder brands. 
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is  because  in  certain  network  industries  only  one  standard  exists  from  the  outset.  For
example, competitors may collaborate to agree upon a single standard up front, and then
compete within this standard for market share. A good example of this is the Global System
for  Mobile  Communications  (GSM)  technology  agreed  upon  throughout  Europe  as  the
standard for mobile network operators. Since no operator owns the standard, all operators
have to compete within the open standard to win market share. Switching costs for changing
operators  within  this  common  standard  are  fairly  low  because  any  GSM  user  can
communicate with any GSM user, regardless of the operators involved. Thus, once a standard
is  set,  whether  through  a  competitive  battle  or  an  upfront  collaboration,  switching  costs
among brands within the network tend to be much lower than switching costs among brands
in incompatible networks. 
Switching Costs: Increasing or Decreasing?
There  is  ongoing  debate  over  switching  costs’  role  in  the  Internet  environment,
where switching costs are often referred to as friction. According to Hax and Wilde II (2001),
the  networked  environment  has  altered  the  nature  of  competition  by  amplifying  the
relationship between customers and suppliers. While switching costs are not a new force,
they argue that the combination of a common digital language and the reach of the network
make switching costs more strategic and powerful in the new economy. They state that “the
Internet is all about bonding,” and that as a result we can expect more friction, or switching
costs, not less in the new economy. 
Shapiro  and  Varian  (1999)  argue  that  frictions  do  not  disappear  in  the  Internet
environment,  they  just  mutate  into  new  forms.  This  enables  firms  to  convert  traditional
markets into lock-in markets by creating information-enabled or synthetic switching costs,
for  example  loyalty  programs.  Firms  are  also  expanding  their  reach  and  providing  more
personalized  information  and  products.  In  addition,  while  switching  costs  based  on
equipment tend to decline as equipment wears out or superior performing equipment comes
along to replace it, switching costs based on information (such as Amazon.com’s customer
databases) never wear out. In fact, they tend to strengthen over time given that the more
information a company has about the client, the better the company can serve the client and
thus further increase switching costs.
In an empirical study by Amit and Zott (2001), switching costs are found to play an
important role in e-businesses’ ability to create value. The authors carry out multiple case
studies on U.S. and European firms and conclude that the four value creators of e-business
are: 1) efficiency, 2) novelty, 3) complements, and 4) lock-in. Their data reveal that firms
achieve lock-in as a result of switching costs and network externalities, and that the strategies
implemented  to  manage  lock-in  include  loyalty  programs,  establishing  dominant  design
proprietary  standards,  establishing  trustful  relationships,  learning,  customization  and
personalization, and virtual communities.
It is important to recognize, however, that not all of the changes in the new economy
are leading to an increase in switching costs. The same changes in technology that provide
firms  with  opportunities  to  create  new  switching  costs  are  enabling  customers  and
competitors to reduce traditional ones. For example, the traditional trade-off between richness
(depth  and  detail  of  information)  and  reach  (number  of  customers  firms  can  reach  and
number of products they can offer) is being blown up (Evans and Wurster, 1999). These
authors explain that information is being separated from things and that this information is
now  accessible  to  millions  of  people  who  are  communicating  through  universal,  open
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brand identity, customer loyalty, and switching costs all rely on various types of information.
They argue that traditional value chains will deconstruct because better informed customers
will find it easier to switch suppliers, thus reducing traditional advantages such as vertical
integration (one-stop shopping) or established relationships. 
The blow-up of the tradeoff between richness and reach leads to several important
changes – reductions in search costs, reductions in transaction costs, reductions in interaction
costs, reductions in asymmetries of information, and an increase in choice.  Each of these
changes causes bargaining power to shift from sellers to buyers (Bakos, 1997; Butler et al.,
1997; Evans and Wurster, 1999; Porter, 2001). New infomediaries, navigators, and online
communities further promote this shift in power by providing customers with more detailed,
timely,  and  objective  information,  and  allowing  larger  numbers  of  buyers  and  sellers  to
interact with one another (Armstrong and Hagel III, 1996; Evans and Wurster, 1999; Hagel III
and Singer, 1999). Hartman and Sifonis (2000) go so far as to say that in today’s competitive
environment traditional customer relationship management is out because it is the customer
who now manages the relationship. Therefore, customers must be listened to and valued, and
if the business does everything right, only then might the customer agree to be served. 
Shapiro  and  Varian  (1999)  recognize  that  new  technologies  can  shift  bargaining
power by reducing search costs and enabling sellers to send out more messages and reach
wider  audiences.  But  they  caution  that  switching  costs  may  remain  prohibitive  because
customers still have to filter through and evaluate all of the offers. Yoffie (1999) provides an
additional message of caution to the frictionless proponents by claiming that because of the
bewildering pace of the Internet, the traditional core elements of competitive advantage –
such as leadership, innovation, quality, customer lock-in, and switching costs – may become
even more important. Brynjolfsson and Smith (2000) support Yoffie’s claim in a study on
Internet  price  dispersion  among  commodity  goods.  The  authors  found  that  while  many
dimensions of friction do decline in the Internet environment, other friction creating factors
such as trust, brand, and awareness may even become more important on the Internet. 
In this section we have shown that customer switching costs take on an increasingly
strategic role in the expanding networked environment. Some of the researchers reviewed
here claim that switching cost opportunities are declining, while others argue that switching
costs are actually increasing in variety and strength as a result of the Internet. We believe that
both arguments are valid. On the one hand, several traditional sources of switching costs have
been reduced or in some cases even eliminated because of the characteristics of the networked
environment. At the same time, some new switching cost opportunities have been created and
certain  traditional  ones  have  become  much  more  powerful  in  the  changing  environment.
Because both increases and decreases in switching costs are taking place, and because of their
potential impact on firm performance, recognizing and understanding these changes is critical
for successful strategic decision making in today’s competitive environment.
3. Conceptualizing Switching Costs
While researchers have provided a great deal of insight into and understanding of
switching  costs,  we  believe  important  aspects  can  be  improved  and  expanded  upon  to
strengthen the conceptualization of the term. In the remainder of this section we discuss these
aspects  and  then,  building  on  previous  work,  we  present  what  we  believe  is  a  more
comprehensive and refined definition. 
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exists that can impact a firm’s competitive advantage (Porter 1980, 1985; Klemperer 1995;
Kotler, 1997; Shapiro and Varian, 1999; Hax and Wilde II, 1999, 2001; Amit and Zott, 2001).
However, their lack of agreement on the specific switching costs makes it difficult to clearly
identify and understand the full range of switching cost opportunities that firms must manage. 
In  Porter’s  view,  “switching  costs  are  fixed  costs  incurred  by  the  buyer  when  it
changes suppliers”, to which he later adds, they are “costs that potentially arise from all the
impacts  a  substitute  has  on  the  buyer’s  value  chain”  (1985).  Therefore,  he  emphasizes
the potential investments that the customer would need to make due to switching as opposed to
investments already made. Klemperer, on the other hand, explains that “a switching cost results
from a consumer’s desire for compatibility between his or her current purchase and a previous
investment”  (1995).  Therefore,  his  emphasis  is  based  more  on  previous  investments  the
customer has made. Finally, the conceptual work of Shapiro and Varian (1999) offers a more
balanced perspective of switching costs as a mixture of both past and potential investments, but
they do not always provide a clear distinction between the two. In light of these different
perspectives, we believe clarification is needed to distinguish between switching costs created
by previous investments and switching costs created by potential investments. 
The other key conceptual aspect of switching costs that we feel can be enhanced is
their  scope.  We  do  this  in  two  ways.  First,  we  add  a  switching  cost  type  called  network
switching costs within the Previous Investments (PI) category. Network (PI) switching costs
arise due to the investment the customer makes in becoming a member of a network. While
memberships have always existed, participation within networks, particularly virtual networks,
has exploded due to the growth in the use of the Internet. The second scope enhancement
involves adding a third category of switching costs that we label Opportunity Costs (OC). As
opposed to the other two categories of switching costs, which result from past or potential
investments, opportunity costs represent opportunities the customer would forego if he or she
switched brands. Thus, switching costs are opportunities that the customer had with the previous
brand that he or she would no longer have with the new brand, even though the customer had
never invested directly in those opportunities prior to the time of switching. We identify two
types of switching costs within the opportunity costs category: 1) network, and 2) complements. 
The switching cost that creates network (OC) switching costs involves the cost of
leaving a network which the customer could have participated in and benefited from. For
example,  if  a  customer  of  America  Online  (AOL)  switches  to  a  different  online  service
provider (OSP) he or she would forego the opportunity to participate in the network (for
example,  virtual  communities)  along  with  AOL’s  30  million  plus  subscriber  base,  even
though the customer had never invested in participating prior to the time of switching. 
The switching cost that creates complements switching costs involves foregoing the
opportunity to benefit from the range of complementary products and services available for
one’s current brand. For example, a customer of a Palm handheld computer who switches to a
competitor’s incompatible handheld computer would forego the opportunity to benefit from
the  wide  range  of  Palm-compatible  software,  even  if  no  investment  had  been  made  to
purchase or learn how to use such software prior to the time of switching. Although both
network  (OC)  and  complements  switching  costs  have  always  existed,  their  presence  has
increased significantly in the information-based economy, especially as a result of the Internet.
We believe that combining the three categories of switching costs discussed above
creates  a  more  comprehensive  and  useful  conceptualization  of  the  term.  In  the  left-hand
column of Table 1 below we list the three general types of switching costs: 1) previous
investments, 2) potential investments, and 3) opportunity costs. Within each of the general
7categories we indicate the range of specific types of switching costs that are possible. In the
right-hand column we describe each of the particular switching costs. Because the different
types of switching costs can and most often do combine to create higher degrees of switching
costs, separating them in practice is not as easy as it is here. However, for analytical purposes
we find it is useful to distinguish among them to provide a clear understanding of the full
range of switching cost opportunities that firms must be aware of.
Table 1.  Classifications of Customer Switching Costs
Type of Switching Cost Description of Switching Cost
1st Category: This type of switching cost results from investments the customer has already 
Previous Investments made in the current brand.
Durable Purchase Investments made in a durable product, the value of which exists for the 
economic lifetime of the product.
Complementary Purchase Investments made in complementary products that are compatible with the durable
equipment previously purchased.
Relationship Investments made to develop relationships with suppliers.
Learning/Training Investments made to learn how to use a particular brand.
Search Costs Investments made to learn about the characteristics of a particular brand and to 
find the right supplier.
Specialized Supplier Investments made in specialized products from a single supplier.
Loyalty Programs Investments made in previous purchases of the brand as part of a frequent 
purchase program that results in accumulated discounts. 
Information and Database Investments in saving information and/or creating databases in a particular 
brand of software technology.
Psychological The psychological cost of having to give up a brand that the customer simply 
likes and therefore feels loyal to for non-economic reasons.
Network Investments made in becoming a member of a network (such as a virtual 
community or chat group) which may include learning and relationship building.
2nd Category: This type of switching cost results from investments the customer would or
Potential Investments could have to make if he or she wants to switch to a different brand. 
Durable Purchase The cost of having to make a new durable purchase.
Complementary Purchase The cost of having to make new complementary purchases (if previously 
purchased complements are not compatible with the new durable purchase).
Relationship The cost of having to develop new relationships with a new supplier.
Learning/Training The cost of having to learn how to use the new brand.
Search Costs The cost of having to find a new brand and supplier.
Contractual Commitment The cost of having to pay a penalty for breaking a legal commitment to purchase a 
certain amount of a brand over a certain length of time from a specific supplier.
Risk of Failure The risk that the new brand will not perform as expected.
Switching Back Costs The cost of having to switch back to the previous brand if the new brand proves 
unsatisfactory.
3rd Category: This type of switching cost results from the opportunities the customer would
Opportunity Costs forego if he or she were to leave the current brand.
Network The cost of leaving a network even if one has not yet invested in becoming an 
active member.
Complements The cost of giving up the benefit of a range of complementary goods and/or 
services that exist exclusively for the customer’s current brand even if the 
customer has not yet invested in or used such complements.
Source: Adapted from Porter (1980, 1985), Klemperer (1995), Shapiro and Varian (1999), and Hax and Wilde II
(2001).
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important  to  recognize  that  within  each  type,  different  degrees  of  switching  costs  are
possible. We suggest the concept of “degrees of switching costs” as a useful way of capturing
this idea (Figure 2). For one, switching costs are not static. Rather, they are almost always
changing either up (strengthening) or down (weakening) the continuum. 
Figure 2. Conceptualizing Degrees of Switching Costs
Secondly, at any one point in time, firms will have customers at many different
stages along the continuum. And third, positioning lock-in at the extreme of the continuum is
fitting because lock-in is an extreme or exceptional case. Few firms will achieve locked-in
customers;  it  is  almost  always  a  question  of  degree.  Thus,  using  the  term  ‘degrees  of
switching’  costs  helps  to  ensure  that  these  dynamic  qualities  of  switching  costs  are
recognized and understood. 
Switching Costs and Competitive Advantage
To finalize our discussion on the conceptualization of switching costs, it is useful to
discuss how they relate to competitive advantage. The two generally accepted strategies for
achieving competitive advantage are low-cost and differentiation (Porter, 1985): either the
firm operates with lower costs than competitors, or provides a product or service with unique
or  superior  features  that  the  customer  values,  or  some  combination  of  the  two.  In  his
discussion on differentiation, Porter emphasizes the important role that switching costs have
in enhancing the firm’s differentiation. He argues that if a firm can develop switching costs at
the same time that it differentiates, it will increase its ability to achieve superior performance
and build a more sustainable competitive advantage.
We believe that switching costs can combine with either differentiation or low-cost
strategies to enhance the firm’s competitive advantage. In addition, we argue that switching
costs on their own can provide the firm with competitive advantage, even when the firm is
unable to achieve or maintain low-cost or differentiation. 
First of all it is important to point out that low-cost and differentiation are not forms
of switching costs, so neither is included in Table 1 above. In other words, each of these two
strategies can create competitive advantage whether switching costs exist or not. However, if
switching  costs  are  generated  by  the  firm  along  with  either  one  or  the  other  of  these
strategies, the firm’s competitive advantage will be more sustainable. In addition, if after
successfully generating switching costs the firm’s low-cost or differentiation advantage is
eliminated by competitors or other external factors, the switching costs may enable the firm
to sustain its competitive advantage. 
9
Degrees of Switching Costs
Low High       Lock-inFirst  we  can  look  at  the  case  of  low-cost  and  differentiation  in  the  absence  of
switching costs. In the case of the low-cost leader, if a competitor comes along and offers the
same product or service but at a lower price, or offers the same price but with a differentiated
product or service, we can assume that the customer will switch brands. Likewise, in the case
of the differentiated offer, if a competitor comes along offering a similarly differentiated
product or service at a lower price or a better differentiated product or service at the same
price, we can assume that the customer will switch brands. 
Because firms face a constant threat from competitors attempting to match or exceed
cost and differentiation advantages, the successful generation of switching costs can play a
key role in strengthening and sustaining competitive advantage, whether that advantage was
initially achieved through low-cost, differentiation, or both. For example, if the low-cost firm
is  also  able  to  generate  switching  costs,  then  the  firm  increases  its  chances  of  retaining
customers even if competitors eventually match or beat their price (depending, of course, on
the degree of the price difference versus the degree of switching costs generated). Similarly,
if the firm offering differentiated products or services generates switching costs, it too will
increase its chances of retaining customers if competitors match or exceed its offering (again,
retention  will  depend  on  the  relative  difference  between  the  brands’  prices  and
differentiation). 
We  are  not  suggesting  that  firms  should  pursue  a  strategy  based  solely  upon
switching  costs,  ignoring  low-cost  and  differentiation.  Such  a  strategy  is  not  likely  to
provide  any  competitive  advantage,  or  at  least  not  likely  to  provide  a  sustainable
competitive advantage.  The firm must provide a minimum degree of competitiveness in
price and differentiation relative to competitive brands. What we are suggesting is that the
firm need not necessarily be the “leader” in price or differentiation to achieve and maintain
a  competitive  advantage.  No  firm  can  achieve  leadership  in  these  two  dimensions
indefinitely. Switching costs are therefore a key strategic complement to these two strategies
that,  if  managed  effectively,  can  enable  firms  to  build  a  more  sustainable  competitive
advantage. 
Figure 3 summarizes the conceptual work discussed in this and the previous section.
The shaded box represents the networked environment – the context in which the switching
cost opportunities exist. The arrows show that these opportunities determine the degree of
switching costs that the firm is potentially able to achieve. This continuum represents the fact
that the customers’ degree of switching costs will range from low to high. At the far right,
when a customer’s switching costs are extremely high, the customer is considered locked-in
to the brand.
10Figure 3. Conceptualizing Customer Switching Costs
The degree of switching costs achieved combines with the firm’s strategies of low-
cost and/or differentiation to determine the firm’s ability to create and sustain a competitive
advantage, which ultimately determines the firm’s performance. However, we provide a note
of caution in Figure 3 to emphasize that generating switching costs merely provides the
potential for superior performance, not a guarantee. This dose of caution is necessary because
achieving switching costs, and achieving them in a way that provides superior performance,
is  a  complex  challenge  involving  many  different  strategic  issues.  In  the  next  section  we
identify and discuss the key issues involved.
4. Key Issues in Managing Switching Costs
With a clear and comprehensive conceptualization of switching costs in place, the
next step towards building the framework is identifying the key issues involved in managing
switching costs. Our analysis of these issues is not intended to be exhaustive. Rather, we
focus on the key issues discussed in the literature. 
One important issue involved in managing customer switching costs is determining
the  firm’s  switching  cost  opportunities  based  on  its  strategic  positioning.  In  the  Triangle
Model developed by Hax and Wilde II (1999, 2001), the authors emphasize the importance of
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Firm Performanceeach position, and the implication these characteristics have in determining the firm’s ability
to generate switching costs and “bond” with customers (Figure 4). 
Figure 4.  The Triangle Model
Best Product  Total Customer Solutions  System Lock-In
Strategy focused on the product’s  Strategy focused on the customer’s Strategy focused on the system’s 
economics: economics: economics:
Low-cost or differentiation Reducing customer costs or Complementor lock-in,
increasing customer profits competitor lock-out, and
proprietary standards
Switching costs based on the  Switching costs based on a wide Switching costs based on
intrinsic superiority of the  offering that satisfies most if  understanding the entire
product or service not all of customer’s needs,  architecture of the system,
especially through close proximity   especially nurturing, attracting, 
to customer, learning about the and retaining complementors
customer (customization) and 
learning by the customer (time 
invested)
Source: Adapted from Hax and Wilde II (1999, 2001).
The  authors  identify  three  main  strategic  positions  available  to  the  firm:  best
product, total customer solutions, and system lock-in. In the best product position, strategy is
focused on the product’s inherent characteristics of either low-cost, differentiation or both. In
the total customer solution position, strategy is focused on the customer’s characteristics or
activities,  and  the  firm  attempts  to  provide  products  and/or  services  that  best  meet  the
customer’s needs. Finally, in the system lock-in position, strategy is focused on the system’s
characteristics, in other words, the focus is on other key elements that make up the firm’s
system. The main elements in this case are the complements (1) of the firm’s product or
service, for example complementary software that works with computer hardware. Although
the three strategies are not mutually exclusive, and a business could decide on a blended
strategy,  the  authors  explain  that  distinguishing  among  them  provides  a  useful  way  of
understanding and analyzing the different bonding strategies available.
Estimating  the  future  revenues  of  the  customer,  also  referred  to  as  valuing  the
installed base, is recognized as another key issue in managing switching costs (Porter, 1980;
Klemperer, 1987a; Shapiro and Varian, 1999). This effort involves segmenting customers
when possible and then comparing total switching costs (switching costs for competitors’
customers,  start-up  costs  for  new  customers)  with  the  anticipated  net  present  value  of
revenues (NPVR) per customer. If the total switching costs (customer’s plus company’s) (2)
involved in acquiring a customer are less than the anticipated NPVR, then the company
should invest in acquiring the customer; otherwise the customer is not a profitable target. 
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(1) A product is considered a complement to your product if by using it the user values your product more.  
A product is considered a competitive product if by using it the user values your product less.
(2)  Company switching costs include costs facing the firm such as finding new customers and the costs of
adding them to their database.Another switching cost challenge involves managing the tradeoff between attracting
new customers and leveraging existing ones (Porter, 1980; Klemperer, 1995; Shapiro and
Varian, 1999). The tradeoff is caused by the desire to reduce prices to attract new customers
and grow market share, on the one hand, and the desire to raise prices to harvest profits from
existing customers, on the other. Because of this tradeoff, once firms develop an installed
base with switching costs they are limited in their ability to deter entry (Klemperer, 1987;
Farrell and Shapiro, 1988; Lieberman and Montgomery, 1988). This creates second mover
advantages for firms with no installed base who are willing to attract new users with lower
prices. 
To  deal  effectively  with  this  tradeoff,  customer  perceptions  must  be  carefully
managed so that potential customers do not get scared off and existing customers do not feel
taken  advantage  of.  One  method  is  to  create  competitors  by  licensing  “second-sources”
(Shapiro and Varian, 1999; Garud and Kumaraswamy, 1993; Farrell and Gallini, 1988). With
the existence of competition, the threat of rendering the buyer hostage to a monopoly supplier
is reduced (Williamson, 1975). The obvious risk is that firms are arming their competition.
However, in certain circumstances, the only chance to establish a market is some form of
coopetition (3) – to collaborate with competitors in growing the market, then competing with
these same competitors in attracting loyal customers (Brandenburg and Nalebuff, 1996). 
One  model  that  helps  explain  the  process  involved  in  managing  some  of  these
switching cost issues is the Lock-In Cycle developed by Shapiro and Varian (1999). This
model  describes  the  process  of  customer  lock-in  in  high-tech  industries,  identifying  four
sequential phases of the lock-in process: 1) brand selection, 2) sampling, 3) entrenchment,
and 4) lock-in, then back to brand selection to repeat the cycle (Figure 5). They insist that
managers must not only anticipate the four stages of the cycle, they must also anticipate the
long-term effects on their customers as they pass through the cycle over and over again. To
effectively manage this cycle, they suggest that firms focus on three principles: 1) invest –
build up the installed base, 2) entrench – increase customer switching costs, and 3) leverage –
maximize the value of the installed base.
Figure 5. The Lock-In Cycle
Source: Shapiro and Varian, 1999.
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Sampling Lock-inFinally, a key problem in managing switching costs is that firms themselves become
locked-in to current successful practices, resulting in a reluctance or inability to anticipate
change  or  lead  innovation  (Hartman  and  Sifonis,  2000;  Christensen,  2001).  Farrell  and
Saloner (1986) describe this inertia as the installed base effect, which occurs when firms
inhibit users from switching to a superior standard because of the network externalities that
exist with the current standard. Yoffie (1996) calls this reluctance to innovate the tyranny of
the installed base. He explains that a firm’s current assets become its future liabilities or core
rigidities  (4)  if  it  does  not  develop  a  willingness  and  capability  to  change.  In  high  tech
industries, he adds, history shows that firms hesitant to innovate for fear of cannibalizing
their own business will soon be overtaken by other firms who have no such fear. 
Shapiro and Varian (1999) have developed a Compatibility – Performance diagram
that describes the innovation challenge involved in managing switching costs (Figure 6). This
diagram was developed to explain the strategic options of firms competing in standards wars
by distinguishing between two alternatives – evolution and revolution. If a company’s offering
remains compatible with the current offering or industry paradigm, the authors classify the
strategy as evolutionary. Although there is likely to be an improvement in the offering, it is
based on the same elements as the previous offering. In this case, compatibility takes priority
over performance in an effort to strengthen the current customer switching costs. 
Figure 6. The Compatibility versus Performance Diagram
Source: Shapiro and Varian, 1999.
If a company’s offering is far superior yet incompatible with the current offering or
industry paradigm, the authors classify the strategy as revolutionary. In this case performance
takes priority over compatibility, which tends to eliminate existing switching costs in pursuit
of entirely new ones. Although combinations of these two strategies are also possible, a
trade-off is usually unavoidable. The authors argue that understanding and managing this
tradeoff is key to managing the migration path of the company’s customers.
In this section we have discussed the key challenges researchers have identified and
tools they have developed to help understand and manage switching costs. In the next section
we build upon this existing work in order to develop a new framework. 
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y5. The Switching Cost Framework 
Effectively managing the switching cost issues discussed throughout the paper is a
complex challenge. In this section we attempt to address this challenge by developing a
switching cost framework. To develop our framework we build upon our conceptual work
and the broad range of switching cost issues and tools discussed. To address all of these
aspects in a structured and coherent manner, the switching cost framework is built around
three interrelated levels: 1) the strategic level, 2) the innovation level, and 3) the operational
level (Figure 7). The netted background of the framework in Figure 7 symbolizes the fact that
switching  costs  must  be  managed  within  an  increasingly  networked  environment.  In  the
remainder of this section we discuss the key aspects of the framework. 































Managing switching costs begins at the strategic level, at which the firm is striving
to maximize its potential performance. We build this level around a strategic positioning
cycle that involves four steps: 1) strategic positioning, 2) identifying and aligning switching
cost opportunities, 3) strategic timing, and 4) estimating potential performance. In the first
step, the firm determines if its strategic positioning will emphasize product, customer, or
system economics, or some combination of the three, which follows the logic of the Triangle
model (Figure 4) described earlier. While these three strategic positions are not mutually
exclusive, their respective switching cost opportunities are based on different strategic factors
and therefore it is useful to understand and distinguish among them. Nonetheless, firms can
shift  from  one  position  to  another  or  expand  from  one  position  to  include  different
combinations of two or three positions.
Identification and Alignment of Switching Costs
Determining the firm’s strategic positioning lays the groundwork for the next step of
this level: identifying and aligning the full range of switching cost opportunities available to
the firm. Our classification of switching costs in Table 1 enables managers to identify all of
the opportunities that they can pursue. While the classifications we provide are generic, firms
can  make  them  specific  by  adapting  them  appropriately  to  their  particular  business,
competitive environment, and industry. Once the opportunities are identified and specified,
firms need to attempt to align the opportunities with the three strategic positions. 
Although  aligning  opportunities  with  positions  is  not  an  exact  science,  it  is  a
valuable  exercise  because  it  forces  managers  to  analyze  the  switching  cost  opportunities
available within their chosen positioning strategy. Such insight can help firms to determine if
they are well positioned or if in fact they need to rethink their strategic positioning. In Figure
8, we have aligned the generic switching cost opportunities with the three strategic positions. 
Figure 8. Strategic Positioning and Corresponding Switching Cost Opportunities
– Network (PI) refers to network switching costs in the Previous Investment classification.
– Network (OC) refers to network switching costs in the Opportunty Cost classification.
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OpportunitiesTable 2 explains the logic behind the way we have aligned the different switching
cost opportunities. In the left-hand column are the strategic positions. In addition there are
two rows entitled overlap to account for the switching cost opportunities that we believe
overlap more than one strategic position. In the right-hand column we align the different
switching cost opportunities. Because we are aligning switching cost opportunities, rather
than  just  switching  costs,  we  explain  our  alignment  logic  from  the  firm’s  perspective  as
opposed to the customer’s perspective. This is consistent with the fact that the framework is
designed to help firms strategically pursue and manage switching cost opportunities.
Table 2. Logic of Alignment of Switching Cost Opportunities with Strategic Positioning






(BP) Psychological – create a brand image that the customer wants to be associated with 




Total Customer  Relationship – create a personal relationship with the customer, independent of the 
Solution (TCS) product or the system.
Focusing on the 
customer’s activities  Training/Learning – train or encourage the customer to invest in learning how to use 
or needs the brand.
Contractual Commitment – convince the customer to commit to a legal agreement.
Loyalty Program – offer awards based on the customer’s volume of use or duration 
with the brand.
Search Costs – make it difficult to compare your brand with competitors’ brands.
Risk of Failure – convince customers that the risk of failure or dissatisfaction is high if 
they switch to a competitors’ brand. 
Switching Back Costs – reduce the costs involved for former customers to switch  
back to your brand if their new brand does not sufficiently satisfy their needs.
(TCS) Durable Purchase – encourage the customer to invest in durable equipment that satisfies 
his or her needs (TCS); encourage investment in multiple compatible pieces of
equipment (SLI). 
Information and Databases – encourage customer’s dependence upon and customized 
Overlap use of software (TCS); encourage use of software in a variety of settings; make the 
software only compatible with or exclusive to your equipment (SLI).
Specialized Supplier – encourage customers to collaborate in developing equipment  
that best meets their needs (TCS); make equipment part of a larger specialized or 
proprietary system or network (SLI).
(SLI)
Network (PI) – build and/or provide access to a network that satisfies the customer’s 
needs (TCS); encourage customers to invest in becoming active members of the 
network (SLI).
System Lock-in (SLI) Complementary Purchase – encourage the customer to invest in complements to the
Focusing on the elements durable purchase. 
of the firm’s system or 
network, especially  Complements – offer a range of complements to the customer’s initial purchase that 
complements the customer will want to utilize and not want to forego.
Network (OC) – build and/or provide access to a network that the customer will want to 
participate in and will not want to forego.
- Network (PI) refers to network switching costs in the Previous Investment classification.
- Network (OC) refers to network switching costs in the Opportunity Cost classification.
17Our alignment of the different switching cost types shown in Figure 8 and described
in Table 2 highlights some interesting results. The first observation that stands out is the fact
that we align no switching cost opportunities directly within the best product (BP) position.
The only exception is psychological costs, which overlaps with this position. This is because
the customer who chooses the brand from a firm in this strategic position does so based on
the product’s economics – either its low-cost or differentiation. As we discussed earlier, these
two dimensions are not switching costs. Rather, they are strategies that can be complemented
and strengthened by switching costs. Thus, aside from psychological switching costs, the
remainder of the switching costs are aligned with the other two strategic positions.
The second key observation is that the total customer solutions (TCS) position offers
the broadest range of switching cost opportunities based on our alignment logic. In addition
to the seven types which we align solely with the TCS position are the additional types of
switching cost opportunities that overlap with the other two positions. It is also important to
note that many of these opportunities (relationships, loyalty programs, networks, information
and  databases,  etc.)  are  enhanced  by  the  characteristics  of  the  expanding  networked
environment that we discussed in section 2 of this paper. 
Finally,  the  main  switching  cost  types  aligned  within  the  system lock-in (SLI)
position  are  centered  on  complements  and  networks.  While  the  range  of  switching  cost
opportunities is not as large as that of the TCS position, the resulting degree of switching
costs can be very powerful if the firm succeeds with such strategies. As in the TCS position,
several of the opportunities aligned with the SLI position (complements, network, etc.) are
clearly enhanced in a networked environment.
Illustrating the Framework: Telefonica Móviles de España
Telefonica  Móviles  de  España  (TME),  the  country’s  leading  mobile  network
operator (MNO), provides us with a useful example to help illustrate the framework. While
TME is active in all three strategic positions, its main switching cost opportunities exist in the
TCS and SLI positions. For example, in the TCS position TME can pursue relationships
switching  costs  through  its  customer  service,  call  centers  and  retail  distribution  centers.
Another opportunity aligned with TCS is TME’s loyalty program, in which customers are
rewarded for their longevity and volume of use. In the SLI position TME can pursue network
opportunities that encourage customers to invest in calling plans (i.e., encouraging families
and friends to all choose TME’s network in order to reduce tariffs on calls to one another) or
chat/special  interest  groups  that  are  exclusive  to  TME  users.  Another  SLI  opportunity
available to the operator is complements, in which TME’s customers have access to a range
of  complementary  products  (such  as  exclusive  content)  and  services  (such  as  exclusive
location based services) (5). 
Timing
The next step at the strategic level is to analyze the role of timing. As we discussed
earlier,  first  mover  advantages  can  be  strengthened  by  switching  costs  (Rumelt,  1987;
Lieberman and Montgomery, 1988). Thus, firms must recognize their timing status (first
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(5) Location-based services are mobile services that make use of the customer’s present location. For example,
the MNO can provide the customer with information about local hotels, restaurants, or directions. mover,  second  mover,  latecomer)  and  then  analyze  how  this  impacts  their  strategic
positioning  and  switching  cost  opportunities.  Continuing  with  our  example  above,  TME
clearly had a large first mover advantage due to its previous monopoly status. Apart from this
advantage, however, TME has been the pioneer in bringing new technologies to the market,
such as being the first to offer SMS (6), the first to provide national GPRS (7) coverage, and
the first to offer a loyalty program (MoviStar points). While first mover advantages have
helped enable TME to dominate the battle for new customers (attracting 55% of all new users
in 2001), its switching cost management is enabling the firm to retain its customers. Thus,
even if TME’s competitors (Vodafone or Amena) respond by matching TME’s product or
service offering (for example, by offering similar national GPRS coverage), TME is likely to
retain its current customers because of the switching costs it has had time to generate. On the
other  hand,  while  TME  has  been  leveraging  its  large  installed  base  for  years,  Spain’s
latecomer MNO Amena entered the market in 1999 with zero installed base. Since Amena
faced no tradeoff between attracting and leveraging customers, it was willing to compete for
new customers with more aggressive pricing than TME, which, as a result of its first mover
success in building up an installed base, had less desire to lower prices. 
Potential Performance
In the final step of the strategic positioning cycle the firm estimates its potential
performance. This estimation is based on the three previous steps of the cycle (positioning,
switching cost opportunities, and timing), as well as its valuation of the installed base as
discussed in section 4. If the firm is satisfied with its estimated potential performance, then it
may not need to adjust the other steps of the cycle for the time being. If, on the other hand,
the  firm  is  dissatisfied  with  its  estimated  potential  performance,  this  analysis  prompts
managers to reassess the firm’s strategic positioning, switching cost opportunities, and timing
in order to enhance such projections. 
Innovation Level
The second level of the framework is the innovation level. To effectively manage
switching costs, firms must either drive change through innovation, or anticipate and react to
change through adaptation. Standing still for too long can be dangerous. We call this process
managing the migration path, a path that can be either evolutionary or revolutionary. 
The  innovation  level  in  our  framework  applies  to  compatibility  (evolution)  or
performance (revolution), building on the compatibility-performance diagram discussed in
section 4. However, in our framework we are concerned with a brand’s compatibility or
incompatibility with the existing competitive paradigm, which may or may not be a standard.
In  other  words,  managing  the  migration  path  applies  to  both  standard  and  non-standard
industries, products, and services. 
The importance of the innovation level is that it forces businesses to recognize the
need for managing switching costs with a long-term perspective. It helps firms to recognize
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(6) Short Messaging Services are short text messages that mobile phone users can send to one another in place
of making a phone call.
(7) General  Packet  Radio  Service  is  a  step  between  GSM  and  3G  cellular  networks.  It  enables  faster
transmission  using  the  GSM  network,  allowing  always-on,  higher  capacity,  Internet-based  content  and
packet-based data services.that some changes are evolutionary, in which case the firm can maintain its focus on existing
switching cost opportunities. The arrow pointing from the innovation level to the operational
level represents evolutionary change, in other words, change that firms can adapt to while
continuing to compete within the same switching cost cycle. The innovation level also makes
clear that switching costs are subject to disruption that can be driven by the firm, the firm’s
rivals, or a range of exogenous forces. Revolutionary changes can unlock the firm’s installed
base, in which case the firm may have to focus on entirely new switching cost opportunities.
The arrow pointing to the “new switching cost cycle” represents revolutionary change, in
other words, change that requires firms to shift to a new switching cost cycle.
A mixture of both evolutionary and revolutionary changes is affecting the Spanish
MNOs and their switching cost opportunities. These changes center around: 1) user habits, 2)
technology, 3) regulation, and 4) new participants. Changing user habits involve a shift from
postpay  to  prepay  agreements  and  an  increasing  use  of  data  versus  voice  when
communicating. While both of these changes have until now been evolutionary, data usage
could  soon  become  revolutionary  based  on  the  second  of  our  four  changing  elements  –
technology. Thus, while technology’s evolutionary changes (WAP (8), SMS, and GPRS) have
not radically altered the industry, its revolutionary changes (UMTS (9) [3G (10)] and the
Internet) probably will. Our third changing element, regulation, is causing only evolutionary
changes. These changes include number portability (which enables users to switch operators
and to take their phone number with them) and the opening up of the market to MVNOs (11).
Finally,  regarding  new  participants,  the  appearance  of  global  MNOs  (Vodafone)  and  the
potential appearance of MVNOs are evolutionary changes. However, new participants such
as  WLANs  (12),  PDAs  (13),  handset  manufacturers,  and  software  manufacturers  are
potentially revolutionary changes.
Operational Level
This third level of the framework focuses on the key operational steps that must be
managed within the context of the changing environment (innovation level) to fulfill the
strategic  objectives  (strategic  level).  We  describe  the  operational  process  of  managing
switching costs as the Switching Cost Cycle. The cycle represents a dynamic process which
involves five stages: 1) invite, 2) entrench, 3) leverage, 4) invite again, and 5) retention or
churn. 
The first invite stage represents the first time that the customer decides to purchase a
particular brand (or sign a contract). To successfully invite or attract new customers, firms
normally have to make investments that are referred to as customer acquisition costs (CAC)
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(8)Wireless Application Protocol is an open, global specification that makes information accessible to mobile
users who use mobile phones, pagers, two-way radios, etc.
(9)Universal Mobile Telecommunication Standard is the 3G technology adopted in Europe and in some areas
of the U.S.
(10)3rd  Generation  mobile  technology  enables  high-speed  mobile  access  to  Internet  Protocol  (IP)-based
services. 
(11)Mobile Virtual Network Operators compete by leasing infrastructure from MNOs and then offering mobile
services with their own branding to customers.
(12)Wireless Local Area Networks are on-premise data communication systems that work on publicly available
radio spectrum and eliminate the need for wired connections. They are typically located in “hot-spots” such
as hotels and airports where business travelers need access.
(13)A Personal Digital Assistant is a small hand-held computer.or  subscriber  acquisition  costs  (SAC).  Determining  how  much  to  invest  is  based  on  the
potential  performance  estimations  made  at  the  strategic  level.  TME’s  CACs  include
advertising and sponsoring of events to create an attractive brand image, subsidizing the
customer’s  handset  purchase,  and  eliminating  contract  customers’  fees  and  minimum
spending requirements. 
Once the customer has made a purchase or signed a contract, the firm moves on to
the second stage of the cycle – entrench. Exactly how the firm will strive to entrench its
customers  has  already  been  determined  at  the  strategic  level  when  the  firm  identified
its switching  cost  opportunities.  Therefore,  at  this  stage  the  firm  is  carrying  out  those
opportunities or strategies to increase customer switching costs. If the firm manages this
stage of the cycle effectively, it greatly increases its chances of retaining customers later on in
the cycle and thus of realizing the potential performance targeted at the strategic level. 
As discussed earlier, the main entrenchment opportunities involve encouraging the
customer  to  make  investments  in  the  brand.  For  example,  through  its  loyalty  program
MoviStar  Points,  TME  offers  prizes  to  its  customers  based  on  their  volume  of  use  and
longevity  as  customers.  In  addition,  it  offers  exclusive  chat  and  special  interest  groups
and customizable content (Reuters WAP Premium) (14) that customers have to learn how to
use and that are only available to TME customers.
Other entrenchment strategies involve building attractive complements and networks
for the brand. TME’s large installed base (55% of the market) generates both complements
and network switching cost opportunities. The large installed base is a valuable complement
because as the number of customers increases, the value of TME’s network for its customers
increases (network externalities). The following two examples help to illustrate why. First,
more customers means more chat and special interest groups, which increases the likelihood
a user will find the topic, group, or person they want to interact with. Second, joining the
largest installed base increases the customer’s probability of making inter-network calls and
therefore of reducing calling charges because calling within an operator’s network is typically
cheaper than calling between operators’ networks due to interconnection charges (15).  
Not only does the firm begin to try and entrench the customer once he or she has
made an initial purchase, but strategies to leverage the customer may begin at once as well.
In other cases, leveraging may not occur immediately, as the firm may decide to wait until it
has achieved what it believes to be a sufficient level of entrenchment with the customer. In
the case of TME, its leveraging strategies focus on encouraging customers to increase usage,
to pay for premium services, and to shop online. In the framework, leverage is intentionally
positioned as one of five stages in the ongoing switching cost cycle. This forces firms to
focus on managing the tradeoff that we discussed in section 4 of the paper. In other words,
firms must consider how their leveraging activities will impact: 1) their ability to invite new
customers that are watching how it treats existing customers, and 2) their ability to retain
customers at the next stage – invite for the second time.
This second invite stage, which is the fourth in the cycle, is the stage at which the
firm’s existing customer must decide if he or she will repurchase the firm’s brand (or renew a
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(14)Reuters WAP Premium is an exclusive content service that TME offers through its partnership with Reuters
Group. The premium content consists of high quality news offered in real time.
(15)Interconnection charges are the charges operators add to calls that are initiated by a user from another
operator’s network but that terminate with a user from their own network.contract).  In  fact,  from  the  moment  the  initial  purchase  has  been  made,  the  firm  is
strategically inviting the customer through entrenchment strategies to stay with the brand. In
most cases, regardless of the degree of switching costs achieved with the customer up to this
stage, the firm needs to make some type of investment once again to invite the customer to
repurchase. If the firm has successfully identified and managed entrenchment opportunities,
then not only should the cost of this second invitation be much lower than the initial customer
acquisition costs, but the chances of the customer making a repeat purchase should also be
greater. 
For example, TME allows its customers to exchange their accumulated MoviStar
points for new handsets as a way to keep customers. Because these points are based on a
customer’s past spending with TME, the customer is indirectly contributing to the cost of the
phone. In addition, costs are further reduced in the form of the reduced risk TME faces when
dealing with a known customer. When TME offers a free or subsidized phone to a new
customer, TME must bear the full cost of the phone or subsidy, thus increasing the cost of the
invitation.  In  addition,  because  TME  cannot  know  in  advance  how  new  customers  will
behave, costs increase due to the risk that such customers will not generate revenues.
If the repeat purchase is made, customer retention (stage 5) is achieved and the cycle
continues:  the  firm  further  entrenches  the  customer,  the  firm  continues  leveraging  the
customer, and another invitation is made to repeat the purchase once again. If the stages
leading up to the second invite stage are not managed effectively, the chances are greatly
reduced that a repeat purchase will be made. The situation in which no repeat purchase is
made is described as customer turnover or customer churn (stage 5). Customers that churn
either switch to a competitor’s brand or stop using the product or service altogether. The main
focus  is  on  customers  that  switch  to  a  competitor’s  brand  because  they  are  generating
ongoing revenues – but for someone else. In other words, these are customers who still value
the product or service, but who have switched brands because their switching costs, or at
least their perceived switching costs, were not high enough for the initial firm to retain them.
Investments  to  invite  back  churned  customers  are  often  made,  especially  to  valuable
customers. These types of investments can be costly and thus, even if successful, diminish
the firm’s realized performance.
An Integrated Framework 
While  each  of  the  three  levels  of  the  framework  plays  a  significant  role  in  the
management of switching costs, focusing on just one or even two of the levels would not
provide a complete approach. By integrating them, the framework ensures that the issues
from all three levels are understood and addressed. In addition, integration ensures that key
relationships among the three levels are understood. These relationships are outlined below.
First is the relationship between the strategic and operational levels. The two-way
arrow shows that each level influences the other. At the strategic level, the positioning and
switching cost opportunities identified will determine the entrenchment strategies, while the
potential performance targets will help determine how much the firm should invest when
inviting customers. 
At  the  operational  level,  the  firm’s  ability  to  retain  customers  will  help  it  to
determine  if  its  strategic  positioning  and  corresponding  switching  cost  opportunities  are
viable. For example, if TME’s retention rate is lower than expected, it will be prompted not
only  to  reevaluate  its  execution  of  the  switching  cost  cycle,  but  also  to  reevaluate  its
22switching cost opportunities identified at the strategic level in an effort to understand the
cause of customer churn. TME could find that competitors are offering to honor accumulated
MoviStar points when customers switch from TME to their brands. As a result, TME will not
be able to enhance switching costs with its points program, regardless of how effectively the
program is executed throughout the cycle. Not only does the framework help TME to reach
such a conclusion, it also prompts the firm to adjust its strategic positioning so that it focuses
on viable switching cost opportunities and avoids an over-dependence on those in decline or
those that no longer exist.
Second is the relationship between the strategic and innovation levels. The two-way
arrow indicates that each level influences the other. On the one hand, the firm’s own strategic
positioning can proactively determine if the migration path is evolutionary or revolutionary.
TME’s pioneering of a loyalty program (MoviStar points), SMS, and GPRS station bases are
changes that clearly affect the Spanish market, though more or less in an evolutionary way.
However, once TME’s 3G base stations are utilized by the mass market, it may be able to
drive revolutionary change with multimedia offerings and intentionally shift the competitive
playing field to a new switching cost cycle. Thus, rather than merely adjusting its position in
reaction to or in anticipation of exogenous changes, TME can drive the change endogenously
and force its competitors to adapt their migration paths accordingly. 
On the other hand, the context or environment in which the firm competes needs to
be continually analyzed by the firm to effectively manage positioning and switching cost
opportunities. If change appears evolutionary, positioning will be relatively stable and the
customer’s switching cost opportunities will remain relatively intact. However, if change is or
could become revolutionary because of competitors’ strategies or other changes such as the
Internet, a new migration path may be necessary, which in turn could force the firm to adjust
its strategic positioning and opportunities. TME’s investments in e-moción (its WISP) (16)
and Terra Mobile (its wireless portal) demonstrate that it is actively repositioning itself in
anticipation  of  the  major  change  that  will  occur  when  3G  technology  makes  the  mobile
Internet a reality. TME recognizes that when these technologies finally become mainstream
for mobile users, switching cost opportunities will shift from those based almost entirely on
voice services to those based increasingly on multimedia services. 
Finally there is the relationship between the operational and innovation levels. The
one-way arrow here indicates that the innovation level influences the operational level, but
not  vice  versa.  If  change  (whether  endogenous  or  exogenous)  is  evolutionary,  the  firm’s
migration path will be to continue competing within the same competitive paradigm (in other
words, the same switching cost cycle) and to continue building upon most if not all of the
existing switching costs. An evolutionary change in the Spanish market such as the entrance
of a global MNO, in this case Vodafone (the world’s largest MNO), definitely intensifies
competition.  Nonetheless,  the  competitive  paradigm  (MNOs  versus  MNOs)  remains
essentially the same as it was prior to Vodafone’s entrance, thus TME can continue building
on the same switching costs that it already had established. 
The  innovation  level’s  impact  on  the  operational  level  is  very  different  if  new
participants  are  capable  of  revolutionizing  the  market.  For  example,  if  either  Nokia  (the
world’s  leading  handset  manufacturer)  or  Microsoft  (the  world’s  leading  software
manufacturer) succeed in their quest to gain control of the software running on the mobile
phone screens of TME’s customers, TME risks being delegated to the role of a faceless
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(16) Wireless Internet Service Provider.infrastructure  provider.  Thus,  these  new  participants  threaten  to  shift  the  wireless
communication industry to a new competitive paradigm, in which many new or perhaps
entirely new switching costs would have to be developed. In other words, TME may have to
switch to a new switching cost cycle to remain competitive. 
As we have seen in this section, the framework that we have developed provides a
useful  tool  for  identifying  and  analyzing  the  key  switching  cost  issues  as  well  as  the
relationships among them. Although applying the framework thoroughly to TME is a process
that goes beyond the scope of this paper, our illustration offers an idea of how the framework
can be applied and the types of insight it can generate. 
6. Discussion and Management Implications
We  have  argued  in  this  paper  that  customer  switching  costs  play  a  key  role  in
competitive strategy and that their role is changing in important ways as a result of the
increasingly networked environment. We also claim that managing switching costs is much
more complex than simply raising switching costs. We show that they are a very dynamic
force  and  that  managing  them  involves  many  difficult  challenges:  managers  need  to
understand what types of switching cost opportunities are available in their chosen strategies;
they need to try and understand the potential strength, or degree, of the different switching
cost  opportunities  they  plan  to  pursue;  they  need  to  recognize  how  switching  costs  are
changing  as  a  result  of  the  increasingly  networked  environment;  they  need  a  long-term
strategic approach for developing switching costs; they need to innovate or quickly adapt to
changes to ensure the maintenance of switching costs over time. By expanding and refining
the conceptualization of switching costs and developing a switching cost framework, we
believe that this paper contributes to addressing these challenges. 
Our conceptualization of switching costs contributes by clarifying, unifying, and
expanding upon this key strategic element.  First, we have shown that while switching costs
have  long  been  considered  an  essential  element  for  achieving  competitive  advantage,
differences  exist  as  to  how  it  is  portrayed  in  the  literature.  By  clarifying  the  different
approaches to switching costs we then are able to unify them in order to develop a more
comprehensive  and  understandable  conceptualization  of  the  phenomenon.  In  addition  to
unifying the existing conceptual work, we expand the concept of switching costs to include
three new types of switching costs. While these new switching costs do not arise solely due
to  the  characteristics  of  the  networked  economy,  we  argue  that  they  are  definitely  more
prominent because of this changing environment. Furthermore we argue that the changing
environment  is  affecting  almost  all  switching  costs  in  important  ways  that  must  be
recognized. Whether or not firms can or want to capitalize on these changes, at least they
need to be aware of them. 
In  addition  to  conceptualizing  the  specific  types  of  switching  costs,  we  also
contribute to the general conceptualization of the phenomenon by suggesting the idea of
“degrees of switching costs”. We feel it is useful to conceive of switching costs in this way
for  several  reasons.  For  one,  the  different  switching  cost  opportunities  enable  firms  to
generate different degrees of switching costs. In addition, each of the opportunities pursued
will generate different degrees of switching costs with customers over time. Finally, the idea
of degrees expands the switching cost discussion well beyond the unusual case of “lock-in”.
Lock-in  may  be  what  all  firms  are  striving  for,  but  in  reality  it  is  a  situation  few  firms
achieve. Most firms are to be found battling continuously somewhere along the switching
24cost continuum, either striving to increase or decrease the degree of switching costs they have
with customers, depending on the situation. Thus, the idea of degrees of switching costs
provides a more realistic approach to this phenomenon and enables us to apply the concept to
a broader range of situations and industries.
The  development  of  the  switching  cost  framework  provides  several  important
contributions as well. First of all, it highlights the important role of switching costs in the
firm’s  strategy  and  performance,  a  role  emphasized  consistently  throughout  the  strategy,
marketing,  and  economics  literature  that  we  reviewed.  The  framework  explicitly  links
switching  costs  to  the  firm’s  strategic  positions  at  the  strategy  level.  It  also  explicitly
links switching  costs  to  firm  performance  at  two  different  levels.  At  the  strategy  level,
switching costs are linked to the performance the firm can potentially achieve, while at the
operational level, switching costs are linked to the performance the firm actually achieves
based on its ability to effectively manage the switching cost cycle.
The  second  important  contribution  of  the  framework  is  the  guidance  it  gives  in
understanding and dealing with the changing strategic role of switching costs as a result of
the increasingly networked environment. Although there is debate over the direction in which
switching costs may be changing, researchers consistently agree that change is occurring.
Thus, while switching cost and lock-in economics have always been present, their form or
appearance tends to change in the networked environment. By guiding a detailed analysis of
switching costs, the framework helps firms to recognize when and how switching costs are
changing. It also helps firms to recognize when switching costs and lock-in are capable of
creating monopolies (though perhaps only temporary monopolies) and locking-in markets
due to the existence of networks, network externalities and positive feedback. 
Third, the framework enhances the analysis and management of switching costs by
ensuring  that  the  analysis  has  a  sufficient  degree  of  depth,  breadth,  time-span,  and
integration.  First,  distinguishing  among  the  three  levels  (strategic,  innovation,  and
operational) ensures the necessary depth by enabling firms to recognize and analyze the three
levels  separately.  Second,  including  the  three  levels  in  one  framework  enables  firms  to
capture the breadth necessary in managing switching costs, as all three levels need to be
accounted for. Third, by ‘time-span’ we mean to say that the framework emphasizes the need
to take a long-term view to managing switching costs. The idea of the ‘migration path’ in the
innovation level along with the idea of ‘cycles’ in the other two levels force managers to
think  long-term.  Finally,  the  framework’s  emphasis  on  integration ensures  that  firms  go
beyond  a  deep,  broad,  and  long-term  analysis  of  switching  costs  to  include  a  dynamic
analysis of the interrelationships between the different levels. 
We believe that only by integrating the analysis of the framework’s three levels
along these four dimensions can switching costs be well understood and managed. Thus,
while each of the existing tools we have discussed in the paper makes a positive contribution
to understanding and managing switching costs, each is limited on its own precisely because
of a lack of such integration. Each of them effectively addresses the issues it was designed to
address, but none of them was designed to provide a complete framework for managing
switching costs, thus a new framework was needed. 
Fourth,  we  believe  this  new  framework  provides  a  powerful  and  in  our  view
necessary strategic lens that can enable new insights and emphases when combined with
other strategy tools or perspectives. Thus, when analyzing the industry, competitors, or key
resources and capabilities using existing approaches, the switching cost lens complements
these approaches by prompting managers to recognize and manage switching costs’ role in
achieving competitive advantage. 
25In addition to applying the switching cost lens to their own business, we suggest that
firms apply the lens to their value net. Brandenburg and Nalebuff (1996) describe the value
net as a map of all of the players involved in the competitive game and their relationships
with one another. The five players include the business, competitors, suppliers, customers,
and complementors. By applying the lens to each of the players, the firm will improve its
understanding of switching costs’ role throughout its entire value net, which in turn should
enhance its ability to effectively manage switching costs, to manage relationships with these
players, and to improve performance. 
The  conceptualization  and  development  of  the  framework  should  reinforce  the
efforts  made  by  other  researchers  to  direct  managers’  attention  to  the  importance  of
proactively  managing  switching  costs.  While  we  believe  this  work  contributes  to  the
understanding of this strategic element, more research clearly needs to be done. For one, due
to the lack of empirical work and theoretical development on switching costs, there is a need
to do more of both. One approach is to conduct multiple case studies to explore the role of
switching costs empirically and to compare findings from different settings. This would be a
logical progression with which we could evaluate the theoretical ideas put forth in this paper.
In addition, we see an opportunity for more cross-fertilization among the fields of research
discussed  in  this  paper,  especially  between  strategy  and  marketing.  Each  of  these  fields
provides valuable insight on switching costs and combining efforts should further enhance
our understanding. 
Finally,  switching  costs  are  still  often  viewed  in  the  literature  as  an  abusive  or
opportunistic  behavior  on  the  part  of  suppliers  and  as  a  problem  for  captive  customers
(Gallini and Karp 1988). Obviously the potential for suppliers to behave opportunistically
towards customer with high switching costs will always exist. However, the rapid pace and
scope  of  change  in  today’s  competitive  environment  increase  the  opportunities  for
revolutions to occur that can unlock customers. As a result, today’s opportunistic firms run
the risk of being locked-out by customers in the future.
Conclusion
In this paper we have attempted to improve the understanding and management of
an important strategic element known as customer switching costs. By reviewing the strategy,
economics, and marketing literature, we show that researchers have long acknowledged the
importance of the phenomenon. In addition, we discuss how switching costs appear to be
changing as a result of the increasingly networked environment. Despite broad recognition of
its important and changing strategic role, we find a lack of coherence and comprehensiveness
regarding  the  conceptualization  of  switching  costs  and  the  tools  or  models  provided  to
manage the force. To address these issues we attempt to build upon and refine the term’s
conceptualization and we develop an integrated switching cost framework. We believe that
the switching cost framework provides a powerful and insightful lens for managers pursuing
competitive advantage in today’s networked environment.
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